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Abstract
Over the past decades, numerous twin studies have revealed moderate to high heritability estimates for individual
differences in a wide range of human traits, including cognitive ability, psychiatric disorders, and personality traits. Even
factors that are generally believed to be environmental in nature have been shown to be under genetic control, albeit
modest. Is such heritability also present in social traits that are conceptualized as causes and consequences of social
interactions or in other ways strongly shaped by behavior of other people? Here we examine a population-based sample of
1,012 twins and relatives. We show that the genetic influence on generalized trust in other people (trust-in-others: h2= 5%,
ns), and beliefs regarding other people’s trust in the self (trust-in-self: h2= 13%, ns), is virtually absent. As test-retest
reliability for both scales were found to be moderate or high (r= .76 and r= .53, respectively) in an independent sample, we
conclude that all variance in trust is likely to be accounted for by non-shared environmental influences. We show that,
relative to cognitive abilities, psychiatric disorders, and classic personality variables, genetic influences are smaller for trust,
and propose that experiences with or observations of the behavior of other people shape trust more strongly than other
traits.
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Introduction
Over a decade ago, ‘‘all human behavioral traits are heritable’’
was stated as the first law of behavior genetics [1]. While
provocative at the time, evidence since then has accumulated to
suggest heritability estimates of 30% or higher on assessments of
cognitive ability, a variety of psychiatric disorders, and even for
most classic personality traits [2–4]. Indeed, a few years later, one
may even add a qualifier to the first law ‘‘All human behavior
traits are quite heritable’’ (italics added). But the question is whether
the quantifier ‘‘all’’ is justified. Is all human behavior quite
heritable? Or are there exceptions to this law?.
Most behavior genetics studies have examined traits which
primary causes are located within the person, either because they
are linked to differences in skill or ability (such as intelligence),
because they are linked to psychiatric disorders (such as
schizophrenia, autism, or ADHD) or because they are part of
the self, such as the classic personality variables [2]. But what
about individual differences traits that are not directly linked to
ability, disorders, or classic personality traits. In particular, what
about individual differences that are closely related to beliefs we
hold about other people? The present research seeks to illuminate
the magnitude of the genetic influences on generalized trust that
people have in others (trust-in-others), and beliefs about the trust
that others have in themselves (trust-in-self).
We focus on trust, because we assume that trust should be
strongly linked to own social interaction experiences, as well as to
public information conveyed in the various media that might affect
beliefs and feelings relevant to trust. Granted, there are other traits
as well that presumably are strongly linked to social interactions
and media influences, such as cooperative motivation or agree-
ableness. However, as we will outline, we assume that beliefs and
feelings relevant to trust are strongly rooted in the others’
behavior. Compared to trust, traits such as cooperative motivation
and agreeableness may be more strongly rooted in ‘‘the self’’.
Trust is often defined as ‘‘the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon the positive expectations of the intentions or behavior
of another’’ [5]. As such, trust involves vulnerability, or
uncertainty and risk that comes with the control another person
has over one’s outcomes, and ‘‘positive expectations’’ which often
imply a set of beliefs in the cooperative intentions or behavior of
another person, or other people more generally [6]. Decades of
research have revealed a remarkable variation among individuals
in their basic levels of trust. Some people readily accept
vulnerability and have positive expectations of other people, while
others do not. Relative to those with low trust, high trust
individuals are more likely to behave cooperatively in the face of
uncertainty and conflicting interests [7–9], report greater life
satisfaction, exhibit greater physical health, and live longer [10].
Such evidence is often explained in theories that emphasize social
interaction experiences as a powerful determinant of the
development of individual differences in trust [11–12].
Extending research and theory, we suggest that social interac-
tion experiences may shape not only the trust we have in others
(trust-in-others) but also the beliefs we hold about other people as
to their trust in ourselves (trust-in-self). For example, when we
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repeatedly are involved in cooperative interaction, we may
develop trust in others, and – perhaps more implicitly – the belief
that others trust us. Alternatively, non-cooperative interaction
experiences may undermine trust in others, as well as beliefs that
other people trust us. Hence, both forms of trust might be
considered as key examples of traits that are closely linked to
experiences or observations of social interactions that are strongly
affected by the others’ behavior.
This claim has received considerable support in the literature on
human cooperation and social dilemmas, in which individuals face
conflicts between self-interest and collective interests [13]. But also
in the other contexts, others’ behavior can exert important
influences on trust. For example, there is recent research showing
that person’s trust in others in general might be promoted when
another person takes good care of that person when in a somewhat
vulnerable situation (e.g., when attaching electrodes for measuring
heart rate) [14]. Also, more indirect sources of social information,
such as information about human behavior in the media, might
also affect our basic trust in others (and perhaps, to some degree,
others people’s trust in ourselves). Thus, our major thesis is that
trust-in-others and trust-in-self should reveal low heritability as it is
strongly shaped by direct experience with or observations of the
behavior of other people.
Here we examine the causes of individual variation in ‘‘trust-in-
others’’ and ‘‘trust-in-self’’, using scales that were validated in a
large sample that is representative of the Dutch adult population.
The scales are summarized in Table 1, and their psychometric
properties are discussed in the Materials and Methods. In
examining the genetic influences on trust-in-others and trust-in
self, we adopt an extended family twin design using a Dutch
population based sample (n = 1,012) of 186 identical and 191 non-
identical twins, 157 non-twin siblings, and 146 parents, 151
spouses, and 181 children of the twins and siblings. In doing so, we
examine the degree to which individual variation in trust is linked
to genetic factors (additive and non-additive) and environmental
factors (shared and non-shared between siblings). Compared to the
classic twin design, the extended twin design has at least three
desirable qualities: It has relatively more power, it enables us to
provide more precise and less biased estimates of genetic and
environmental influences, and it allows modeling of non random
mating of spouses and gene-environment correlation [15–16].
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The data were collected as part of a large ongoing project on the
genetics of cognition [17–18] for which we obtained (a) from the
participants written consent for information to be stored and used
for research, and (b) ethical approval by the Medical Ethical
Testing Committee (METC) at the VU University Amsterdam.
The analyses are based on data of adults aged 18 years or older.
Sample and Procedure
Data included 1,012 twins and relatives (451 men, 561 women;
44.6% and 55.4%) from 264 different families who at the time of
participation were registered at the Netherlands Twin Register
[19]. The mean number of participating family members was 3.8.
The average age of the participants at the time of measurement
was 45.3 years (SD=14.10, range: 17–70). The sample included
377 twins (49.3% MZ) and 157 siblings, and 146 parents, 151
spouses, and 181 children of the twins and siblings.
Determination of zygosity of same-sex twins was based on DNA
polymorphisms (89 pairs, 83.96%) or, if information on DNA
markers was not available, on questions about physical similarity
and confusion of the twins by family members and strangers.
Agreement between zygosity diagnoses from survey and DNA was
97% [20]. All five zygosity groups were reasonably well
represented: monozygotic males (MZM: N=235; 23.2%), mono-
zygotic females (MZF: N=256; 25.3%), dizygotic males (DZM:
N=115; 11.4%), dizygotic females (DZF: N= 237, 23.5%) and
dizygotic opposite sex (DOS: N=169; 16.7%).
Measurement and Reliability
The trust-in-others and trust-in-self scales were designed to
include three items that were central in existing scales [5–8],
thereby capturing items with positive valence (‘‘I completely trust
most other people’’) and negative valence (‘‘When push comes to
shove, I do not trust most other people’’), both of which explicitly
used the word ‘‘trust’’, and an item that captured the broad
behavioral implication of the trust: the intention to accept
vulnerability, as explicated in one of the most widely-accepted
definitions of trust [5] (‘‘I dare to put my fate in the hands of most
other people’’). The three-item scales of trust-in-others and trust-
in-self were pre-tested in 2006 in an online survey administered by
TNS/NIPO, a Netherlands Institute for Public Opinion. In this
pretest, using a large sample (n=1804; 849 men, 955 women; age
range 18–98, M=46.63, SD=16.53) the scales for trust-in-others
(a= .68) and trust-in-self (a= .77) were deemed reliable, especially
in light of the fact that both scales comprised only three items, and
included 2 positive items and 1 negative item. To provide evidence
for the temporal stability, we examined the test-retest reliability in
an independent sample of 59 participants (44 women, 15 men; age
range 18–71, M=40.54, SD=15.187) over a period of two
months. Test-retest reliability of the trust-in-others and the trust-
in-self scales were high or moderate: r= .76 and r= .53,
respectively, and provide an upper limit to the estimate of
heritability. The internal consistency and test-retest reliability were
judged as suitable, and hence, the scales were included in the
present project. At the same time, we acknowledge that the
relatively modest sample size, along with the moderate test-retest
reliability for trust-in-self, allow us to provide preliminary (rather
than conclusive) evidence for the heritability of trust, especially for
trust-in-self.
We calculated mean sum scores for trust-in-others and trust-in-
self in our genetics of cognition samples of 1012 twins and
relatives. As in the pretest, the trust-in-others and trust-in-self
scales were reliable (respective as = .69, and .73). All measures
were corrected for age and sex to avoid spuriously increased
similarities in MZ and same-sex DZ twin pairs. For all analyses, 40
(3.8%) individuals were excluded due to missing values on the
trust-in-others scale and 26 (2.8%) individuals were excluded due
to missing values on the trust-in-self scale. The complete
questionnaire was sent out to participants by mail, and yielded a
response rate of 76%.
Results
The mean sum scores of the trust-in-others and trust-in-self
scales were 15.88 (SD=2.78) and,13.48 (SD=3.69) respectively.
The two constructs were correlated (r= .558, p,.001) and thus
shared about 31 percent of the variance. As noted earlier, the
scales are conceptually different, in that trust-in-others focuses on
(generalized) trust in others, whereas trust in self focuses on beliefs
regarding others’ trust in the self (see Table 1). The fact that they
share variance may be partially explained by the notion that social
interactions often involve either mutual trust or mutual distrust,
which people develop cooperative interaction or noncooperative
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interactions, respectively. Thus, from an interaction perspective,
trust-in-others and trust-in-self are likely to be interrelated.
On average, men and women did not significantly differ in
terms of trust-in-others (unstandardized b= .46, SE= .24, t=1.97,
p= .051) or trust-in-self (unstandardized b= .26, SE= .18, t=1.50,
p= .134). The only effect we observed was a significant association
with age, such that younger people were more likely to have
greater trust-in-others (unstandardized b=2.03, SE= .01, t= 2
3.25, p,.01) and greater trust-in-self (unstandardized b=2.01,
SE= .01, t= 22.17, p,.05).
To assess genetic and environmental influences, we estimated
15 correlations between relatives in a saturated model that does
not hold any assumptions regarding genetic and environmental
influences underlying trust: MZ twins; DZ twins/sibling; parent-
offspring; cousins avuncular via MZ twins; cousins avuncular via
DZ twins/siblings; nieces/nephews via MZ twins; nieces/nephews
via DZ twins/siblings; spouses; spouses in law via MZ twins;
spouses in law via DZ twins/siblings; spouse-spouse via MZ twins;
spouse-spouse via DZ/siblings; spouse in law avuncular via MZ
twins; spouse in law avuncular via DZ twins/siblings; parent-
offspring in law (see Figure 1). The pattern of phenotypic
resemblance between pairs of relatives that differ in genetic and
environmental similarity provides insight into the relative contri-
bution of genetic and environmental influences. If a trait is under
genetic influence, then relatives that are genetically more alike are
expected to show a higher phenotypic resemblance.
In a twin-family design, the observed MZ correlation for a trait
represents the upper boundary of the heritability. Correlations
among other types of relatives, relative to the MZ correlation and
relative to correlations among other relatives, help to quantify the
heritability of the trait. We include many different genetic relations
in our sample to precisely estimate different sources of variation.
To illustrate, MZ twins are genetically 100% similar, DZ twins
share on average 50% of their segregating genes, and cousins via
DZ twins (CODZ) share on average 12.5% of their genes and
spouses (SP) do not share any of their segregating genes. If a trait is
heritable, then we expect phenotypic correlations to be a function
of the degree of genetic resemblance. In this example, we would
expect the phenotypic correlation pattern for a heritable trait to
reflect rMZ . rDZ . rCODZ . rSP. However, if phenotypic
correlations are equal between pairs of varying genetic similarity,
then the trait is not under genetic influence. If we allow for more
complex models, for example non-random mating where spouses
select each other based on phenotype, differential correlational
patterns are expected.
Subsequently, structural equation models were specified in
which individual differences in trust were modeled as a function of
genes and environment and possible effects of non-random mating
of spouses. Two types of genetic influences (additive genetic factors
(A) and genetic dominance (D)) and three types of environmental
influences (shared environmental factors (C), cultural transmission
(CT) and non-shared environmental factors (E)) were distin-
guished. ‘A’ represents additive effects of alleles summed over all
loci. ‘D’ represents the extent to which the effects of alleles are not
additive (genetic dominance or epistasis). ‘C’ represents common
environmental influences that render offspring of the same family
more alike. ‘CT’ represents shared environmental factors due to
cultural transmission.
We should also briefly comment on the meaning of cultural
transmission in the present model. Cultural transmission is the
transmission from parents to their children of the environmental
factors that are related to the traits under study (i.e., trust-in-
others, and trust-in-self). In the present model, these environmen-
tal factors are transmitted from the parental environment to the
offspring’s environment. Because children who are raised in the
same home, grow up within a common environment as created by
their parents, cultural transmission is by definition part of the
shared environment in the offspring.
Presence of both cultural transmission and genetic transmission
will result in a correlation between A and CT (i.e., rGE). ‘E’
represents all environmental influences that result in differences
between members of a family. E also includes measurement error.
Table 1. Scales for Measuring Trust-in-Others and Trust-in-Self.
The following statements are about your impression of ‘‘most other others in your environment’’. These can be friends, acquaintances, colleagues, or unknown others as
long as you face them every now and then - that they are part of your environment. We ask you for each of the following statements to indicate the degree to which
agree or disagree with the statement.
1 = Completely disagree
2 = Largely disagree
3 = Slightly disagree
4 = Agree nor Disagree
5 = Slightly agree
6 = Largely agree
7 = Completely agree
Trust-in-Others
1. I dare to put my fate in the hands of most other people
2. I completely trust most other people
3. When push comes to shove, I do not trust most other people (r)
Trust-in-Self
1. I think that most other people dare to put their fate in my hands
2. I think that most other people trust me
3. When push comes to shove, most other people do not trust me (r)
Note: The headings ‘‘trust-in-others’’ and ‘‘trust-in-self’’ were not used in the actual questionnaire. They are included here for reasons of clarity. (r) indicates reverse-
scored.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093880.t001
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Statistical significance of parameters was tested by comparing the
fit of nested (increasingly more restricted) models to the fit of less
restricted models, using maximum likelihood optimization, imple-
mented in Mx software [21], using a criterion level a of .05 for all
tests.
Observed correlations between relatives in the saturated model
were generally low and did not differ for pairs of relatives that
differ in genetic relatedness (trust-in-others: x2(14) = 18.31;
p= .193; trust-in-self: x2(14) = 10.40; p= .733), implying no signif-
icant genetic influences. They were also not different for pairs of
relatives that were raised in the same family or not, suggesting no
effect of shared environmental factors on trust. Figure 2 shows the
observed correlations (and 95% confidence intervals) for pairs of
relatives grouped by genetic relatedness for both trust-in-others
and trust-in-self.
Table 2 lists the statistical properties of all models that were
fitted to the data, including tests of significance (x2 difference test)
for all estimated parameters and additional statistics describing the
fit of the different models (i.e., Akaike’s Information Criterion
(AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and Deviance
Information Criterion (DIC)).
For the trust-in-others, the decomposition of the variance into
genetic and environmental components showed good fit to the
data (Model O-2 in Table 2, x2(6) = 8.94; ns;). Within the full
genetic model for trust-in-others, non-shared environmental
factors explained 90% of the variance; the remaining variance
was attributed to genetic dominance deviation (5%), and effects of
cultural transmission (5%). Structural equation modeling showed
that eliminating genetic effects or the effects of cultural transmis-
sion from the model did not result in a significant worsening of the
model fit (Models O-3, O-4, O-5, O-7, and O-8 in Table 2),
implying that these factors individually did not explain a
significant part of the variance. A model in which all factors but
non-shared environmental factors were eliminated, however,
resulted in a significant deterioration of the model fit (Model O-
6 in Table 2). This implies that 5% of the variance in trust-in-
others is explained by either genetic or cultural transmission from
parents to offspring Based on AIC, BIC, and DIC indices, a model
in which the variance of trust-in-others is explained by non-shared
environmental factors and effects of cultural transmission explains
the data better than a model including non-shared environmental
Figure 1. Genetic model for a DZ twin pair with parents, spouses and offspring. Notes: A = additive genetic effects, D = genetic dominance,
E = non-shared environmental effects, C = shared environmental effects, f = cultural transmission path, w=gene-environment correlation, q = variance
additive genetic effects, s = residual variance additive genetic effects twin generation, m= residual variance additive genetic effects offspring
generation, j = variance shared environmental effects, b = residual variance shared environmental effects twin generation, n = residual variance
additive genetic effects offspring generation, P = parent, T =DZ twin, Sp= spouse, O = offspring. Please note that additional siblings (and their
spouses and offspring) are not included in the figure for reasons of convenience. Also note that only two children (per spouse pair) in the offspring
generation are included in Figure 1 while a maximum of four is included in the analyses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093880.g001
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factors and additive genetic effects (Models O-5 and O-8 in
Table 2, respectively).
Decomposition of the variance of the trust-in-self into genetic
and environmental factors revealed good fit to the data (Model S-2
in Table 2: x2(6) = 3.59; ns). Within the full variance decompo-
sition model, variance of trust-in-self is explained by non-shared
environmental factors (86%), genetic dominance deviation (10%),
additive genetic effects (3%), and effects of cultural transmission
(1%). Genetic factors and effects of cultural transmission were
however not significant (Model S-6 in Table 2).
The most parsimonious models were a model including E and
CT for the trust-in-others scale in which E explained 95% of the
variance and CT explained the remaining 5% of the variance. For
the trust-in-self scale, the most parsimonious model included solely
the E component; that is, 100% of the variance is explained by E.
Based on the full model, broad sense heritability estimates for
trust-in-others and trust-in-self were 5% and 13%, respectively,
and not significantly different from zero (see Table 2). It could be
argued that the lack of a significant heritability is due to a lack of
power, even though the power is optimized due to the inclusion of
many different pairs of relatives. However, the point estimates of
heritability in the full model are quite modest, and the pattern of
low correlations across all pairs of relatives are not suggestive of
high heritability. Nevertheless, replication of the present results
Figure 2. Weighted mean correlation (95% confidence interval) between relatives grouped by degree of genetic similarity for
Trust-in-Others (top) and Trust-in-Self (bottom). Notes: correlations are constrained to be equal across twins and regular siblings and across
sex; MZ= twin-twin MZ; DZ= twin-twin DZ/sibling; PO=parent-offspring; AVMZ= cousins avuncular through MZ; AVDZ= cousins avuncular through
DZ/sibling; COMZ=niece/nephews through MZ; CODZ=niece/nephews through DZ/sibling; SP = spouse-pairs; SMZ= sister/brother in law through
MZ; SDZ= sister/brother in law through DZ/sibling; SMZS= spouse-spouse through MZ; SDZS= spouse-spouse through DZ/sibling; SAVMZ= aunt/
uncle cousin in law through MZ; SAVDZ= aunt/uncle cousin in law through DZ/sibling; POS=parent-offspring in law. The additive genetic correlation
(A) and the non-additive genetic correlation (D) between two members of a relationship are within parentheses. For every phenotypic correlation the
theoretical correlation for additive genetic influences (A) and non-additive genetic influences (D) is provided under the assumption of random
mating. These correlations indicate the genetic resemblance between the different pairs of relatives.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093880.g002
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would provide more conclusive evidence for the absence of
substantial genetic effects for trust. Because it was not feasible to
examine the test-retest reliabilities in the present sample, we
examined it in an independent sample (n=59) addressing stability
over a period of two months. Test-retest reliability for both scales
were moderate or high (r= .76 and r= .53, respectively, see
Methods and Materials), indicating that measurement error could
not explain the high influence of non-shared environmental
influences.
Finally, we have also conducted a series of analyses to
investigate the impact of non-random mating on the variance
decomposition of the trust-in-others and trust-in-self scales.
Although the spousal correlations were moderately high and
similar in magnitude as the MZ correlations (r= .10, p= .11; and
r= .19, p= .004), for Trust-In-Others and Trust-In-Self, respec-
tively), the associations did not affect the genetic variance in the
sample under study. Genetic variance in the population will only
be increased if there is genetic variance for the trait on which
assortment is based. For both Trust-in-Others and Trust-in-Self,
we do not observe genetic variance; hence, no increased genetic
variance was observed. We have modeled the non-random mating
as a function of the environment; that is, partners were believed to
be alike because they share a similar environment (for a graphical
representation, see Figure 1).
Discussion
The present findings show that that the heritability of trust
(trust-in-others, h2=5%, ns; others’ trust-in-self, h2=13%, ns) is
virtually absent, and more modest than that of various expressions
of abilities, psychological disorders, or classic personality traits.
Clearly, such findings demonstrate an exception to the law that all
human behavioral traits are quite heritable. Indeed, non-shared
environmental influences accounted for virtually all of the
phenotypic variation in our trust in others and our beliefs of
others’ trust in ourselves.
We would like to point out that the estimates of the genetic and
environmental parameters would have been different if only MZ
and DZ twin pairs were considered in the analyses, i.e. as in the
classical twin study. The rationale for estimating heritability in an
extended twin-family design is that when estimating heritability
based solely on MZ and DZ twin correlations, a number of
significant assumptions have to be made. In a scenario where these
assumptions do not hold, estimates of heritability may be biased.
Estimating heritability in an extended twin-family design, as we
did in the present study, allows testing some of the assumptions
and therefore significantly reduces potential bias of the estimate of
heritability. For example, in the classical twin design, where only
the resemblance between MZ twins and between DZ twins is
considered, we have to assume the absence of assortative mating,
the absence of cultural transmission, and the absence of either
non-additive genetic influences or shared environmental influences
since these cannot be estimated at the same time. This is why we
and others [22–23] have advocated previously that estimates from
twin studies do not always correctly reflect the genetic and
environmental sources of co-variation.
If the current study had been based on solely MZ and DZ twins,
we would have concluded that the heritabilities of trust-in-others
and trust-in-self are .16 and .17, respectively and that all genetic
variance would be non-additive. Note that when the DZ
correlation is less than .5 of the MZ correlation, as in the present
research for both trust-scales, the heritability as calculated from
twin correlations typically equals the MZ correlation [24].
Information obtained from including pairs of relatives other than
MZ and DZ twins in the study clearly shows that this conclusion
would have been incorrect. For both trust-in-others and trust-in-
self we observe phenotypic resemblance for pairs of relatives with
no non-additive genetic similarity, which does not agree with the
conclusion that all genetic variance is non-additive. Moreover, the
pattern of phenotypic correlations that we observe when
considering all pairs of relatives does not follow a pattern of
genetic resemblance (i.e., phenotypic correlations do not follow the
decline in genetic similarity between more distant relatives)
indicating that genetic influences are modest at most (i.e. 16–
17%) yet probably absent.
The low impact of genetic influences on trust is remarkable
compared to heritability estimates for other traits such as autism
(h2=90%) [25], schizophrenia, (h2=81%) [26], major depression
(h2=37%) [27], or general anxiety (h2=32%) [28], or general
cognitive ability (h2=80%) [17]. What is perhaps even more
remarkable is that in the same sample, the heritability estimates
were a fair amount higher for childhood experiences, such as
reading experiences and family functioning (h2=62%), leisure
time activities (h2=52%), social network (h2=36%), and even life
events (h2=29%) [18]. As such, beliefs about human nature, as
reflected by trust-in-others, and other people’s beliefs in them-
selves, seem to be strongly shaped by non-genetic influences. We
know of only one published study among a specific sample of
adolescents and young adults (17–33 years) that revealed for only
some judgments that are linked to trust a heritability greater than
20%, but this was not observed for a negative item, ‘‘people take
advantage’’ which yielded a heritability of 14% [29]. And a study
on behavioral trust in a trust game revealed a heritability of 10%
to 20% [30], but behavioral trust may also assess risk-taking,
cooperative motivation, and may not be temporally stable; also,
this particular study included a modest sample size (329 same sex
twins, including 71 DZ and 258 MZ twins). In contrast, the
heritability of giving and risk-taking tend to be in the 20%–30%
range [31], as are various political attitudes and beliefs that vary
on the conservative-liberalism spectrum [32]. Hence, the genetics
of politics, and giving, is likely to be accounted for by variables
other than trust, such as flexibility in information processing [33]
or values regarding solidarity and egalitarianism [34].
The present findings suggest the importance of distinguishing
between individual differences that are prominently shaped by
others in our social interactions – as cause and consequence – and
individual differences that are more strongly shaped by the self in
social interactions, such as the classic variables of extraversion and
agreeableness [2] as well as giving and risk-taking [31]. Trust, in
particular, might be strongly shaped by the persons we encounter,
and less so by the self. Moreover, in light of the variety of
interaction partners and situations that different people encounter,
it is understandable that the genetic influences for trust indeed
tend to be relatively modest. Most of the variance is accounted for
by non-shared environmental influences. We should note that the
various kinds of gene-environment interactions may be included in
our estimate of the non-shared environmental influences, and so
perhaps some genetic effects on trust do exist and are revealed
through gene-environment interactions. A case in point is when
people differ in terms of having direct or indirect experiences with
social exclusion, burglary or assault, which in combination with a
trust-relevant genetic background may facilitate the expression of
low trust. This may happen, for example, when people (based on
their genetic make-up) are more likely than others to be involved
in situations or exposed to negative views of humankind (e.g.,
people who professionally deal with detecting fraud and crime
versus those who professionally are more likely to witness the
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goodness of people) that might undermine or strengthen our
feelings and beliefs relevant to trust.
But in the absence of strong genetic influences, what does
account for differences in trust? Note that the differences between
families did not seem to matter much. The variance accounted for
by cultural transmission was 5% for trust-in-others, and even non-
significant for trust-in-self. Hence, social interaction experiences,
direct or vicarious, outside of the immediate family are perhaps
more essential than often is assumed. Beliefs relevant to trust may
well be shaped by social interactions at school or at work, as well as
by some observations of interactions in the various media, where
trust-supporting and trust-undermining experiences take place
[35–36].
Indeed, it is plausible that to some degree there are no strong
genetic influences on the likelihood of being involved in situations
that might strongly undermine or strengthen trust. For example, it
is possible that specific yet powerful experiences (such as being
fired or victim of burglary) or some societal trend (such as
economic decline) help us understand variation in trust that would
seem stable over at least some time. It does not need to be stable
‘‘personalities’’ per se that is captured by our measurements of
trust-in-others and trust-in-self. One might speculate that at least
in part the measurements capture a change in beliefs and
orientation that will last for some time, but that may over longer
periods of time return to those aspects of the self (base-line levels)
that we tend to call personality. And it is possible that the base-line
levels themselves are subject to systematic change. The present
findings reveal a tendency that that trust may decline with age,
which is interesting in light of previous evidence demonstrating
cooperative and prosocial orientation increases with age [37].
People may become more prosocial in orientation despite a
modest decline in trust.
Conclusions
One of the most ‘‘social’’ traits of all – trust-in-others, trust-in-
self – seems to challenge the first law of behavior genetics: Perhaps
everything is heritable, but trust is only modestly heritable, at best.
At the same time, given that we did not find any effect of shared
environment, the second law of behavior genetics seems support-
ed: The effect of being raised in the same family is generally
smaller than the effect of genes. The challenge for future research
is, therefore, to uncover the role of interaction experiences, and
perhaps (social) media experiences, outside of the family that might
help shape the trust we have in others, and the trust we think other
people have in us.
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